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INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PROBLEM
WITH INCREMENTALISM
†

SAUL LEVMORE

Incrementalism, as opposed to dramatic change, is conventionally lauded
in law as the prudent path of change—a path that gives credit to history and
precedent. The conventional view, however, pays little attention to interest
groups. Step-by-step change poses a serious problem when it rearranges the constellation of supporters and opponents of further moves. The core problem is
that once an interest group loses and becomes subject to some regulation, it has
reason to turn on its competitors and see to it that they also be regulated. The
laws that emerge on the incrementalist’s path therefore may not mark progress
toward socially desirable or democratic outcomes. Examples of incrementalist
laws include environmental standards, smoking bans, disability accommodations, and minimum-age legislation. Nearly all law, however, can be seen as
incrementalist, just as most tradeoffs can be described as sliding on slippery
slopes. The incrementalism problem is most striking when a prior regulatory
step is costly to reverse from the perspective of those who must comply. The problem is alleviated when there is real learning from experience; it is exacerbated
when advocates of change implement a divide-and-conquer strategy to separate
defending interests. Compensation policies or even moratoria on certain kinds
of regulation could possibly decrease wasteful rent seeking and minimize the
interest-group problem.
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INTRODUCTION
It is easy to encourage lawmakers to be moderate, or incrementalist.
The case for incrementalism—under which regulation can provide for
experimental stopping points that do not necessarily portend further
movement along a slippery slope—is built on claims about unintended consequences, expectations, risk aversion, and learning by
doing. Meanwhile, any proposal for sweeping change can be derided
as the product of impatience and an inadequate appreciation of history and precedent. Incrementalists favor leaps over baby steps only
when systems are regarded as beyond repair or bad habits need to be
broken with shoves rather than nudges. The presence of multiple
sources of law and interactive lawmaking may also encourage incrementalism. Since legislatures, courts, executive officers, administrative agencies, and even voters interact, incremental lawmaking is often
the strategy most respectful of each player’s role. In this stew, each
cook is told to fear that drastic action will spoil the broth.
1
Leading commentators encourage incrementalism. Most of the
encouragement is directed at judges, but the arguments used in favor
1

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUCOURT 4 (1999) (arguing that minimalism promotes deliberative democracy);
Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 519-22 (2008) (contrasting the “optimal search” approach, which “recommends considerable innovation”
in the hunt for a “successful” policy, with the Burkean approach, which “favors incremental change that is regularly evaluated empirically”); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 362-66 (2006) (describing judicial minimalism as constraining judges to shallow and narrow changes in law). Most of the cases discussed in
PREME
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of incrementalism are equally applicable to regulators and legislators.
Incrementalism might also mean different things to different observers: one person’s moderation is another’s drastic change, and every
new law can be seen as a step toward far-reaching change. For present
purposes, however, a proposal is incrementalist if advocates of more
drastic change will support the proposal both because they approve
the change it represents and because it may be a step toward their
larger goal. It is, for example, incrementalist to propose a limitation
on gun ownership or a smoking ban in limited areas with the aim of
eventually prohibiting all firearms or smoking in all public places.
The conventional view of incrementalism pays little attention to
2
interest groups. There is a serious problem with piecemeal change,
however, when it rearranges the constellation of supporters and opponents of further moves and gives organized interest groups reason
to realign themselves in response to the incremental change. I begin
with such matters as the prohibition of smoking in restaurants (while
smoking remained legal in bars and hotels) and the requirement of
ramps and other disability accommodations (initially in new buildings
and then in some older structures). One can almost freely substitute,
however, the imposition of progressively more exacting fuel-economy
standards on automobile manufacturers and the establishment of incentives to achieve targeted reductions in the production of heat3
trapping gases. Incrementalism is everywhere—though certainly not
this Article deal with legislation and regulation, although some of the changes, such as
disability accommodations, came about through judicial action.
The argument advanced here also applies to judicial decisions, for they, too, are
influenced by interest groups—in litigation as well as in appointment and confirmation. The type of influence, however, is different. Stare decisis also changes the argument as applied to courts: legislatures are not bound by any such principle. Finally, as
is well known, various doctrines and conventions limit interest groups’ ability to control the order in which incremental (or drastic) change is proposed to courts. See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000) (discussing the impact of doctrines such as
standing and stare decisis on court decisions); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from
the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) (arguing that the
standing doctrine prevents opportunistic litigants from controlling the critically important path of legal decisions). For the most part, the incrementalism problem in judicial decisionmaking is left for another day.
2
For example, two recent discussions of incrementalism do not discuss the effects
of interest groups. See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 855 (2007); James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or
One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental Extension of Rights Is Not a Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W.
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001).
3
As we will see, the last example represents a serious incrementalism problem.
Fuel-economy standards, however, do not, because they resemble minimum-age legis-
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everywhere alike. There is little reason to be confident that the laws
that emerge on the incrementalist’s path represent progress toward
socially desirable or democratic outcomes—though I will make the
realistic assumption in most of the examples here that we are uncertain about the location of the social optimum. Part I describes representative cases and explores what I call the “incrementalism problem.”
This problem is especially interesting when a prior regulatory step is
irreversible from the perspective of those who must comply. Part II
suggests that a common defense of incrementalism—that policymakers learn from experience and therefore from small, prior steps—is
rather weak. The discussion extends the scope of the incrementalism
problem to minimum-age legislation and to the larger topic of slippery (and nonslippery) slopes. Part III explores the idea of using
compensation to solve the incrementalism problem. Compensation
could push interest groups to form coalitions that can optimally defend against the divide-and-conquer strategy that is at the core of the
incrementalism problem. This is an offshoot of the claim that, in a
world with overachieving interest groups, we need organized groups
4
to oppose one another in order to obtain desirable results. This coalition-formation, or power-politics, approach to incrementalism, however, proves difficult to implement. One problem is specifying the
conditions that trigger compensation; virtually every proposed law can
be framed as embedded in a larger picture such that every law becomes a sly incrementalist move. Another problem becomes apparent
when the focus shifts from power politics to rent seeking (i.e., resource-consuming activity undertaken to gain a profit or governmentsponsored advantage). The possibility of obtaining compensation is
likely to increase wasteful rent seeking by those who gain from influencing lawmakers. The problems with most things compensatory
suggest a solution, sketched in Part IV, that begins with upfront disclosure of regulatory aims and then provides for a moratorium on
lation and other regulation that does not divide and conquer different groups. See infra
Section III.C.
4
One commentator describes this claim:
Many years ago, James Buchanan suggested a solution: The U.S. could select—
perhaps at random—some other group of people about the same size as the benefitted group and could put the tax on them. Thus, two lobbying groups would be
opposing each other and the outcome presumably would be improved.
Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking and Tax Reform, CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES, Oct. 1988, at 37,
46. On assessing the power of interest groups and the magnitude of rent-seeking behavior, see Paul J. Stancil, Assessing Interest Groups: A Playing Field Approach, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1273 (2008).
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regulation beyond a specified limit. Again, the problem is more apparent than the solution. A brief conclusion follows and suggests that
incrementalism in lawmaking should be feared as often as it is welcomed. As the discussion works toward this conclusion, it has two aims,
one positive and one normative. The positive aim is to develop a tool of
analysis; the incrementalism problem and its possible solutions can help
us to understand the path of lawmaking and the role of interest groups
in forging that path. The normative aim is to argue against those who
believe in moderation in all, or most, things. My claim is that this view
of optimal change ignores the presence of interest groups.
I. INCREMENTALISM AND IRREVERSIBILITY
A. The Incrementalism Problem
Consider a case in which the American Association of People with
Disabilities, or perhaps an advocate for disabled veterans, seeks to impose new building requirements in a jurisdiction that previously required accessibility only in new construction. The proposal mandates
wheelchair-accommodating ramps in all commercial buildings, which
5
would require substantial retrofitting. Owners of these buildings are
5

The actual progression of the law has been complex. Congress first passed the
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, which requires accommodations for people with
disabilities in all new federally funded construction. Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4156 (2006)). A variety of other regulations culminated in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which requires “reasonable accommodation” of the disabled in all places of employment with fifteen or
more employees and in all places of public accommodation. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12201, 12203–12213 (2006)
(amended 2008); 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (2006)). The latter category is a broad one
that includes most places in which commercial activity is undertaken. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7) (2006) (defining “public accommodation” to include, among other things,
hotels, theaters, bakeries, and laundromats). The courts largely determine what accommodation is reasonable.
Architectural requirements for new construction are remarkably detailed. See U.S.
ARCHITECTURAL & TRANSP. BARRIERS COMPLIANCE BD., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT (ADA) ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES (2002), available at
http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/html/adaag.htm (detailing complex requirements
for ramps, stairs, elevators, drinking fountains, and many other features of new structures). For a detailed discussion of the evolution of these regulations, see Jonathan C.
Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation
and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1376-1405 (1993).
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) regulates residential buildings. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–
3619 (2006). In 1988, the FHA was amended to include people with disabilities. Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006)). Under the FHA, landlords must
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opposed, if only because compliance will be costly. These owners did
not choose to install ramps before the law required them to do so,
even though it might have helped them generate more revenue since
most other buildings remained inaccessible. They will argue that disabled persons can work and shop in other buildings where ramps have
been voluntarily constructed or where ramps have been required by
law in new construction. These vulnerable property owners would like
to gain political support from other groups, including their tenants,
owners of multifamily residential buildings, small shop owners whose
structures are likely excluded from the “commercial buildings” category, and perhaps even owners of single-family homes. But even the
most sophisticated members of these groups are unsure whether to
devote resources to opposing or supporting the proposal. From the
perspective of shop owners, for example, the proposal will increase
their competitors’ costs, much as the previous legislation benefited
many of them indirectly by raising the costs of new construction. Sophisticated owners recognize that advocates or lawmakers who champion the cause of mandated accommodations will likely advance their
agenda step-by-step. Store owners and even homeowners might wonder whether lawmakers will eventually require them to modify their
properties at significant cost and with a very small prospect of offsetting revenues.
In the most straightforward version of what I will call the “incrementalism problem,” the accommodation advocates consider only the
benefits—not the costs—of accommodations and aim to push the law
as far as they can. Perhaps they favor government-mandated access
allow disabled tenants to make adjustments to unit and common spaces. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(3)(A). In addition, all new residential buildings with four or more units
must be made handicapped-accessible. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(C).
The example in the text may also be understood as concerning local law, which
often precedes or adds to federal law. California, for example, enacted broad disability
legislation in 1980, and this regime has been updated frequently and incrementally.
See California Fair Employment and Housing Act, ch. 992, 1988 Cal. Stat. 3138 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–12996 (West 2009)). For an overview
of the California enactment, see generally Michael L. Murphy, John H. Fanning Labor
Law Writing Competition Winner, Assembly Bill 2222: California Pushes and Breaks the
Disability Law Envelope, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 495 (2002). The example in the text is intentionally ambiguous as to whether the requirement will attach to all older buildings
or only to those that have been renovated or otherwise modified. The ambiguity reflects the pattern of existing law, in which the rules for new construction apply to the
modification of older buildings, whereas the owners of untouched older buildings
must simply remove architectural barriers that can readily be eliminated. It also suggests, however, that courts or agencies can choose to be more or less aggressive in declaring which buildings must be modified.
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ramps wherever there are stairs and no lifts. Of course, doors could
be widened and products on shelves made more accessible. These advocates, as I will call those who wish to alter the status quo, perceive
that if these aspirations were packaged into a law and proposed in one
fell swoop—in dramatic rather than incremental fashion—then they
would be defeated. The loss would occur because of the combined
resistance of owners, especially those who could be easily organized in
order to overcome the familiar collective action problem, joined per6
haps by tenants and retailers. If the advocates begin with large commercial buildings, where the cost-benefit calculus is likely to be most
compelling, because ramps involve fixed costs and more users suggest
greater benefit, then the opposition might be dispersed, modest in
number, and unlikely to generate sympathy. If successful here, the
advocates can turn their attention and political resources to other
7
structures, stores, or residential buildings. In this next step, the
property owners directly affected by the previous step will have no reason to oppose the extension of the law. In fact, they will likely favor
8
the next incremental move because it levels the playing field. A ramp
6

The question why new construction has been regulated more readily than old
buildings or retailers remains. A few explanations can be offered. It is normally less
expensive to build ramps when starting anew than it is to retrofit, so a cost-benefit
analysis might have caused lawmakers to favor regulating new construction either as a
start or simply to earn the highest social rate of return for a given investment. New
construction costs also fall largely on dispersed and unidentifiable future owners of
properties, who may simply be less able to stand up to the advocates for improved
access. In any event, the owners of newly constructed and regulated buildings have no
great reason to favor (or disfavor) the regulation of preexisting structures unless they
think that some of these will close down and rents will rise elsewhere.
7
The tale in the text depicts a strategic advocacy group, but the incrementalism
problem does not depend on conscious, strategic behavior. Advocates may innocently
push for an incremental change because they perceive that the smaller change is all
that can be obtained at present. They may be unaware of the alignment of interest
groups opposed to the changes they support. It is nevertheless a problem if this happens repeatedly, as if there were strategic division of the defense, and in a manner that
takes us away from the social optimum.
8
Competition is probably the key to recognition. In 2009, for example, United
Parcel Service (UPS) supported legislation that would put employees of FedEx, its direct competitor, under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act; it had previously operated under the Railway Labor Act. See Alex Roth, FedEx and UPS Clash over
Legislation, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at B1 (noting that regulation under the National
Labor Relations Act would make it easier for FedEx employees to unionize); Press Release, FedEx, Railway Labor Act, available at http://ir.fedex.com/releasedetail.cfm?
ReleaseID=388559 (“FedEx Express has been correctly covered by the [Railway Labor
Act] since our first day of operation in 1973.”). An important difference between the
regulatory structures is that workers can unionize on a location-by-location basis under
the former but not the latter. We can think of the reaches of the Railway Labor Act
and of the National Labor Relations Act as having been incrementally altered.
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requirement will not raise the marginal cost of products in stores, but
it might push some stores out of business and raise rents in already
regulated commercial buildings. The incrementalism problem is that
a legal intervention might be both socially inefficient and democratically disfavored yet come about because advocates can nudge the law
to that end step-by-step, taking advantage of uncoordinated opponents. The advocates might do this without any grand design, but the
problem is more obvious when there is a strategy. An early target of
regulation may not plan or be expected to turn against its competitors,
but it will not labor to protect its competitors from regulation.
We might think of the incrementalism problem as one of several
ways in which the output of a political or judicial process appears paradoxical. There are intransitivities that cannot be solved; a number
of voting paradoxes drive home the point that when we aggregate preferences, we often get results that seem illogical but are in fact nearly
9
inevitable. Then there are slippery slopes, such that the final resting
point of a law is something unwanted when the polity started down
the slope. Transaction costs, self-interest, and a variety of other factors can make this so. The guiding principle in each of these sources
of unease is that law can be path dependent in a way that is troubling
10
even to citizens who do not have idealistic expectations of the law.
This somewhat stylized tale of mandated investments, which may
or may not be socially efficient, involves strategic behavior by advo9

Many well-known voting paradoxes arise out of preferences that cannot be aggregated in a way guaranteed to be consistent and to meet other seemingly simple requirements of democratic decisionmaking. See William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams,
The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1235, 1241 (1973) (analyzing the
logrolling paradox and concluding that “if each [legislator] behaves rationally by making the trades possible for him, all the members suffer. They are, in fact, worse off than
if they had voted sincerely or naively.”). The problem may be compounded in the
presence of overachieving interest groups. See generally Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes
and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1999) (discussing the basic voting paradox
as well as logrolling and other voting paradoxes and introducing the idea that interest
groups exploit paradoxes). These paradoxes are also present in the judicial context.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 823-31
(1982) (examining the decisionmaking processes of the Supreme Court from a publicchoice perspective and concluding that inconsistency is inevitable in such an institution).
10
In describing the mechanisms of the slippery slope, Eugene Volokh describes
how mandatory gun registration could lead to gun confiscation even though confiscation could not have garnered sufficient support at the initial stage. See Eugene Volokh,
The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1033 (2003) (“Registration
may change people’s attitudes about the propriety of confiscation, by making them
view gun possession not as a right but as a privilege that the government grants and
therefore may deny.” (emphasis omitted)).

LEVMORE_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

The Problem with Incrementalism

2/15/2010 7:47 AM

823

cates but little foresight on the part of those who would be regulated.
In the accommodations example, it is easy to see the incrementalism
problem from the perspective of the owners of significant commercial
properties, but, of course, that is not the same as asserting that there is
a serious social problem. That conclusion, as well as the quest for solutions to it, normally requires that the optimal regulation be identified.
Here, as elsewhere, identification of the optimal regulation is unlikely both because some of the costs are nonpecuniary and because
extensive experimentation and data gathering would be required in
order to assess the benefits of accommodations in selected locations,
the effects of subsidies for accommodations, the share of benefits that
might be obtained with modifications only to buildings located near
accessible public transportation, and so forth. The same will be true
for other instances of incremental lawmaking by legislatures, courts,
and agencies. Indeed, one question to address is whether this incrementalism problem has any bounds at all. For the present, I address
only the questions of the social optimum and of boundaries. I suggest
that we first get a sense of the problem of incrementalism and then
see whether it can be solved in a way that minimizes the risk of creating a social problem when none previously existed.
The incrementalism problem may also take the form of producing
the “wrong” regulation rather than too much regulation. If A wants to
gain Z by regulating W, then regulating X, then Y, and finally Z, and
the social optimum is likely to be W, A may look to start with the
group that not only can be divided and conquered but also will be
most effective if it joins A and turns on a competitor in the second
step. A may have the political power to take any one step, and it may,
for example, bring about the regulation of X, knowing that X will then
turn on Y using X’s own political power. Power politics may be such
that W, X, and Y end up being regulated in that order, when in fact
either W alone, or perhaps W and then X only, should have been regulated. In most of what follows, examples are constructed to emphasize the problem of too much regulation. It should be understood, however, that there may instead, or also, be a danger of the
wrong regulation. For example, smoking bans may have been imposed on restaurants before bars not because there is more secondhand smoke in restaurants or because a cost-benefit calculus suggested that the restaurant ban was the superior “investment.” Rather,
smoking bans may have been imposed because advocates perceived
that restaurant owners, once regulated, would be better at overcoming
their collective action problem—in order to bring about the regula-
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tion of bars—than would bar owners. Once regulated, each group
would likely favor the extension of the ban to the other inasmuch as
they are rivals for patrons. If advocates’ perceptions are incorrect, this
incrementalism may cause the regulation to end with restaurants even
if the social optimum includes the regulation of bars.
Returning to the specific case of access ramps, it is plausible that
the cost of retrofitting buildings makes the optimum policy one of requiring ramps only for large buildings, where this cost is spread over
many users. In the absence of legal intervention, the market might
arrive at something close to this conclusion on its own and might improve on legal intervention by settling on ramps in some but not all
11
locations of each type. In any event, let us posit that existing singlefamily homes and small shops will definitely escape regulation because
lawmakers uniformly perceive such regulation to be socially inefficient, because advocates choose to expend their political capital on
higher-valued ends, or because the owners of these homes and shops,
however dispersed, have enough political power to defend against the
considerable costs that would be imposed. Still, it is clear that inefficient law might result from the divide-and-conquer strategy. Store
owners, for example, are not well organized and do not know whether
to join with the owners of larger commercial properties in opposing
regulation that is drafted to apply only to the latter group. It might be
that they free ride on the defense mounted by the larger property
owners; it may be that they are simply too dispersed to organize in opposition; and it may be that they miscalculate how far legislation will
go, though this last mistake has little to do with incrementalism.
If a single party owned all of the structures in a jurisdiction, there
would be no incrementalism problem, or at least not one of the kind
defined here. Based on the details first (or subsequently and incrementally) proposed, a property owner might miscalculate the investment it
should make in opposing legal intervention. There might, in this sense,
be an incrementalism issue, but one not different from that faced by
participants in markets and politics everywhere, who must assess the intensity of preferences and the strategic behavior of other parties.

11

Market solutions normally involve change over time, so we do not expect all property owners who install ramps to do so at the same time. The owners may have different
costs, discount rates, and so forth. A legal mandate generally requires compliance in a
specified time period; sometimes the effective date is in the future, and even then different owners can comply at different times. Effective dates and grandfather clauses are
other sources of incrementalism and subjects of interest-group activity.
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For example, if A seeks to return a product purchased from B, or
sues B because the product was found injurious, B needs to decide on
its response without knowing whether A or another buyer will subsequently seek to return other products or bring suit regarding other
injuries. B may underinvest or overinvest, but we normally expect B to
bargain with A, and we use the law of fraud to constrain the responses
the parties give one another when asked specific questions. Somewhat
similarly, when X and Y contract, X may get better terms by implying
that, over time, it will order more of Y’s goods if satisfied; in response,
Y may lower its price or overinvest in servicing the account. However,
Y can protect itself in the contracting process. Y can stipulate that the
price of each item shipped to X will be q dollars but that there will be
a discount to p dollars if X orders more than one thousand items within the calendar year. If this creates too great a risk that Y will lower
quality, X can contract for extra payments in the event of defective
products and so forth. The incrementalism problem can in this way
be seen as a problem of incomplete information; X and Y can overcome this problem, to a degree, with more bargaining.
The property owners who fear governmental regulation are less
able to solve their problem in this way because they have much higher
transaction costs. They may need to bargain with legislators and with
a variety of interest groups. Moreover, bargains with governments are
not so easily made or enforced. It is difficult for the government to
12
“precommit” regarding future law, and markets for hedging the risk
of future law are undeveloped. But the easiest way to think about the
singular character of the incrementalism problem may be to recognize that when commercial parties, like X and Y, face incomplete information about subsequent transactions, they operate within the discipline of a competitive market. X can make contractual demands on
Y regarding future business because X can otherwise find another
supplier who will guarantee future prices or quality.
The government, however, faces little market pressure. When
it—or the interest groups or temporary legislatures that comprise
“it”—misleads property owners about future regulation, there is
normally no recourse. If the government were a benevolent monopolist, there would be no incrementalism problem because the government would have no reason to hide its regulatory intentions or
12

See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 618-22 (1996) (noting that, absent internal congressional regulations to facilitate precommitments, the
judiciary is unlikely to enforce serious restrictions on legislative second thoughts because of their undemocratic nature).
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13

cost-benefit analyses. It is when the government is an intermediary
of sorts, motivated by competing interest groups, that the incrementalism problem becomes a threat as a result of the coordination problem
among groups.
It bears repeating that a coordination issue is not necessarily a social problem. If the advocates, rather than the defender-owners, have
serious organization costs, then it may be a good thing if they can divide and conquer the property owners, as that might help the process
14
of power politics find its way to the social optimum. Indeed, many of
the examples advanced here can be shaped so as to depict the advocates of change as the players with the collective action problem, who
might be divided and conquered or stymied. It is only by choosing
examples in which the advocates have a unitary goal, whereas the defenders must not only coordinate politically but also be prepared to
suffer significant compliance costs in the event of regulation, that the
15
incrementalism problem is made to appear on one side alone. Re-

13

There is the question how a monopolist would impose or price access ramps in
a market where subsequent “customers” valued the ramps at decreasing amounts. I do
not pursue this analogy here because my emphasis is on interest groups.
14
This is one application of the analysis in an article by Eric Posner, Kathryn
Spier, and Adrian Vermeule. See Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian Vermeule,
Divide and Conquer 38-39 (Univ. of Chi., Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 467,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1414319 (asserting that the divide-andconquer strategy is ubiquitous, that it is normatively hard to assess unless we know the
social optimum, and that a fairly common “solution” is to impose a kind of equaltreatment rule, the success of which will depend on context). Note that the equaltreatment rule suggested by Posner, Spier, and Vermeule is unworkable in our regulatory setting because of the difficulty in identifying when situations are alike. Moreover,
there is presumably some optimum that contradicts the value of equal treatment. It
cannot possibly be that ramps should be everywhere.
15
The focus on advocates rather than defenders might also be justified with the
observation that the advocates set the agenda; they are on the attack and it is easier to
think of them as dividing and conquering the defenders than the other way around.
It should be noted that the incrementalism exercise undertaken here introduces a
kind of status-quo bias because I do not pause to ask how we came to the prevailing
smoking, accommodation, or other policy that advocates now try to undo or outdo.
But it is difficult to start in any other place, and the takings literature, which is something of a foil below, does much the same. There, too, we can ask whether existing
property rights are fair or even efficient before we endeavor to restrain inefficient takings. See Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
181, 183-89 (2003) (hypothesizing that property rights, both real and intellectual, may
plausibly evolve as the result of wealth-maximizing allocations or interest-group pressures; regulatory law normally assumes the former and might add to the inefficiency
when the latter is instead true); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S423-33 (2002) (arguing that every instance of privatization may have transaction-cost and interest-group explanations; without a great deal

LEVMORE_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

The Problem with Incrementalism

2/15/2010 7:47 AM

827

gardless of whether the collective action problem is as great for advocates as it is for defenders, it may be useful to think of incrementalism
as a problem of nondisclosure, or even as a kind of fraud, since we
normally think that full information is a good idea. For example, if
the initial access proposal made it seem as though ramps would not be
required in stores and homes, then it would be troubling to learn that
advocates had moved step-by-step to include all buildings, especially if
they had induced the earlier losers to their side in the later steps of
the political game. I will continue to refer to incrementalism as problematic, though troubling is sometimes a better word. An important
but modest version of the argument advanced here is that we ought
not celebrate incrementalism because it will normally be difficult to
know whether incremental changes in law, and especially in legislated
16
law, are desirable.
B. Irreversibility
Not all instances of incrementalism are alike. The prospect of
smoking bans—imposed by government order rather than by entrepreneurial decision—in aircraft, restaurants, hotels, offices, shops,
and bars presents a different story from that of access ramps. It is
tempting to see the same problem, or at least likelihood, of advocates
going far past the social optimum as they take on one set of interests
after another—defeating them one at a time when they could not
have defeated them all at once. But one difference between the cases
is that ramps represent a kind of irreversible, sunk cost, whereas smok17
ing bans can be reversed. In theory, if advocates move on to bars af-

of evidence to determine the actual origin, further government interventions that disturb the status quo are hard to evaluate).
16
A note of caution in the other direction is also appropriate. Incrementalism
may produce the wrong results even when there is no collective action problem among
interest groups. Defenders may underinvest if they think that each regulatory step is
minor and not worth opposing with sufficient force. But this is a problem with all bargains, as discussed in the text. There is also the danger that disparate interest groups
care about proposed regulations to different degrees, so that it will be difficult to allocate costs, and the danger of free riding will therefore be greater. I do not emphasize
this sort of collective action problem here because there is no reason to think this
problem greater for advocates or defenders and no reason to think it is more of a
problem with respect to incrementalist proposals than to more drastic ones.
17
Once the ramps are built, the regulated party has no interest in reversing the
ban because there is no marginal cost to further compliance. In contrast, a smoking
ban presumably imposes continuing costs on the entrepreneur who objects to it. See,
e.g., Nicholas A. Danella, Note, Smoked Out: Bars, Restaurants, and Restrictive Antismoking
Laws as Regulatory Takings, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1095, 1112-13 (2006) (reporting
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ter establishing a ban on smoking in restaurants, bar owners and restaurateurs could join forces not only to block the proposed ban in
bars but also to roll back the restriction on restaurants. In the case of
access ramps, the requirement attached to commercial buildings
might have been similarly reversed as part of a package once other interests formed a political coalition. However, the owners of commercial buildings will have already invested in compliance; it is not as if
they can disassemble the ramps and sell them at cost. In fact, regulations of that kind are rarely reversed (in the absence of technological
change), because there is very little political pressure to do so; there is
little pressure, because there is little benefit to those who have invested in an irreversible fashion. It is thus probable that the incrementalism problem is relatively serious in the case of disability accommodations because the divide-and-conquer strategy is likely to be
successful given the irreversibility feature. Once a group loses, it has
no incentive to join the defense when the next group is attacked, and
it may even have reason to support the attack.
This interesting difference between cases in which compliance
costs are essentially upfront, nonrefundable investments and cases in
which there are ongoing costs is less impressive if there is an endowment effect with respect to regulation. For instance, once smoking is
banned, parties and expectations adjust so that there is much less
pressure to reverse a law than to prevent its enactment in the first
place. Still, it is doubtful that such an endowment effect can ever be
as powerful as the fact of irreversibility; thus, the problem of incrementalism remains more remarkable when compliance with an earlier
step in the regulatory process is irreversible. The incrementalism
problem is itself reinforced by the endowment effect such that laws,
once on the books, are not easily removed.
sales declines of thirty percent or more in bars subject to smoking bans). But see Lainie
Rutkow et al., Banning Second-Hand Smoke in Indoor Public Places Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Legal and Public Health Imperative, 40 CONN. L. REV. 409, 442 (2007)
(“[P]eer-reviewed evaluations of the economic impact of smoking bans have definitively
refuted this claim. . . . [I]f anything, many restaurants and bars experience neutral or
positive economic effects after smoking bans are implemented.” (footnote omitted)).
Many other differences exist that do not advance the present argument. Thus,
there is a case to be made against smoking bans on the ground that consumers can
simply avoid establishments that permit smoking such that some sorting will provide
places that do and do not permit smoking. It is possible that it is more difficult for
owners of buildings to capture a portion of the benefits created by access ramps. And
it is certainly puzzling to observe overwhelming political success and yet so little market
success in the preceding period. All this can be disputed and is, in any event, not necessary to the point advanced in the text.
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The problem is not as simple as sketched to this point. There is
no reason to think that most owners targeted in the first step of ramp
requirements will overlook the fact that the accommodations about to
be required are costly and irreversible. If these owners think that political battle will help their cause, they will seek allies among other interest groups, and they will try to impress upon these potential allies
that the advocates for access will surely turn next to requiring further
accommodations. The irreversible character of the proposed ramps
(or elevators, or any other required improvement) is neither secret
nor subtle. It ought to affect the likelihood that disparate interest
groups will form a coalition to battle against an early regulatory step.
In contrast, when the owners of restaurants try to convince the
owners of bars to join them in fighting the proposed ban on smoking,
both groups know that, if they fail to form an alliance at the first step,
there will be opportunity to form one later on, if the second step of
lawmaking develops. If we compare the targets of the first steps in the
two regulatory arenas, we see that those who must add accessibility
ramps are in some sense worse off than the restaurateurs subject to a
smoking ban, because the former’s compliance involves an upfront
cost and is irreversible. On the other hand, the fact that the restaurateurs’ compliance is a matter of reversible, ongoing behavior makes it
more difficult for them to acquire allies for a defense at the first step.
The incrementalism problem is in this way somewhat smaller than
might first appear, because, as the problem looms larger, disparate interests will be more inclined to form coalitions at earlier stages.
It is, however, implausible that this homeostatic device is so remarkable as to match the problem itself. Owners face transaction
costs and a variety of collective action problems that make the divideand-conquer metaphor seem appropriate. A large invading army, A,
surely prefers to face two unrelated opponents, B and C, rather than
one large opponent, D, that is as powerful as B and C perfectly combined. There will be many cases in which A can battle B and then
turn its full might on C, often with assistance from the remnants of B,
much as the commercial property owners might eventually favor the
law’s extension to other properties. At best, B and C will sometimes
form a defensive alliance, but that makes A no worse off than it would
have been with D as an opponent.
C. Reversibility by Compensation
No regulation is entirely irreversible, because subsequent law can
require retroactive compensation to one who paid to fulfill an un-
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funded mandate. I call this retroactive compensation, though that
expression seems unnecessarily duplicative, to distinguish it from
compensation that is promised in advance. One who has property
18
taken by the government is compensated; one who incurs costs by
way of regulation might be retroactively compensated, in whole or in
part, either because the government might choose to pay or because a
legal regime might provide compensation for the loss incurred at step
one if and only if some other legal step is taken at step two. Compensation for government takings does not normally depend on results in
subsequent legal steps. Thus, our commercial property owners might
eventually join a coalition opposed to requiring ramps in all residential buildings, if that coalition agrees that it will press for a bill requiring retrofitting only when the government is willing to pay the costs of
modification—with a requirement that the government pay the costs for
accommodations mandated and retrofitted during the past several years.
This kind of legislative bundling appears to negate the role assigned
to irreversibility. It does not undo the social loss from building ramps
that would not have survived cost-benefit analysis, but it is the private
cost rather than the social loss that affects owners’ willingness to join in
the political power struggle. The prospect of retroactive compensation
might cause a previous loser to join a defensive coalition. If so, the
smoking-ban and access-ramp cases are close relatives. It is immediately
apparent that compensation must play an important role in further discussion of the incrementalism problem and in power politics (i.e., the
19
notion of pitting organized interests against one another).
Reversibility by compensation seems like a promising means of
eliminating or at least reducing the incrementalism problem. It
avoids the larger question of why we do not require that all burden20
some regulations provide compensation. Virtually all legal systems
provide for something like fair market value compensation for the
21
complete taking of private property for public use, but no legal system constitutionalizes or legislates compensation for the burdens ac18

See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
19
See infra Part III.
20
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 57 (1985) (arguing that compensation should be paid if “the government remove[s] any of the incidents of ownership [or] diminish[es] the rights of the owner in any
fashion . . . no matter how small the alteration and no matter how general its application”).
21
See, e.g., DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 169 (2002)
(“The basic legal standard for determining what constitutes just compensation is well
established: the owner is entitled to the fair market value of the property taken . . . .”).
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companying mundane regulations, even when they fall on a narrow
set of people or entities. Compensable regulatory takings are rare because of valuation difficulties, because it is too difficult to tax or otherwise to raise money from those who benefit from regulation, and
because it is too difficult to establish a baseline from which such tak22
ings are measured. Still, it is worth noting that if all regulatory burdens were compensated—or at least those that were not means of
combating criminality, negligence, or nuisance—there would not be
an incrementalism problem because there would be no reason for a
23
property owner to object to socially efficient regulations. Although
reversibility by compensation can be seen as a selective application of
a broader takings law, its purpose is very different from that normally
found in the takings literature. There, the idea is to protect invest24
ments in private property, to encourage only efficient government
25
interventions, to diminish incentives to engage in political activity at
26
the expense of dispersed interests or single owners, and perhaps to
27
provide insurance to losers. In this Article, however, the notion is to
prevent and to reverse inefficient regulation by giving those who were
once burdened reason to join coalitions that might block further, presumably inefficient, regulation. This is, of course, an optimistic view.
22

See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 610-15 (1984) (arguing that the judicial approach to regulatory takings is unsatisfactory, and proposing an approach based purely
on maximizing economic efficiency in which the government can be said to supply
otherwise unavailable insurance through ex post compensation); Thomas W. Merrill,
Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 111 (2002) (“When one
examines American compensation law, however, one finds that . . . there is little guidance about how to measure just compensation in regulatory takings cases.”); Jeremy
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1438 & n.110, 1441
(1991) (stressing the need to identify a “neutral baseline” in takings cases so that
courts may evaluate regulation “against a reference point that is not provided by the
regulators themselves . . . [nor] upon a method for evaluating regulatory goals that is
more than merely the courts’ own judgment concerning the wisdom of the regulation”).
23
Incrementalism could still be a problem because voters, now burdened not only
by inefficient regulations but also by the financial responsibility of compensation,
might pay more attention to drastic changes than to small ones. Advocates might thus
slide things past voters by proceeding incrementally. This, however, would be a different kind of incrementalism problem.
24
See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 21, at 35 (“[C]osts [of uncompensated takings] . . . include . . . the foregone investment caused by fear of such losses on the part
of property owners more generally.”).
25
See id. at 41-42 (discussing efficiency as a basic justification for compensation).
26
See id. at 39 (“Takings result from a deliberate decision by political majorities to
take the property of a minority.”).
27
See id. at 38 (“Compensation . . . performs roughly the same function as mandatory insurance . . . .”).
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It might be that the regulation undertaken in the first step was efficient, and now, the promise of compensation generates a coalition
that not only defeats incremental regulation but also reverses the earlier, desirable law. In any event, takings law is more a reference point
than a source of rules applicable to the issues explored here. Among
other things, incrementalism may be a problem where there is no
“property” right at issue, so reversibility by compensation is independent of takings law.
For reversibility by compensation to work, potential political allies
must know that it will be forthcoming. But retroactive compensation
is hardly a constitutional right, and though it might be promised in a
bargain, there is no way to enforce that bargain. An association of
store owners may gain an alliance with owners of commercial properties, who lost in the previous step, by promising to push for compensation even as they forestall further regulation. The store owners, however, might back out or relax their efforts in the face of compromise
legislation that proposes to exempt singly owned stores but does not
offer compensation to those who had earlier been forced to invest in
ramps. The owners of commercial buildings may not be able to observe the effort expended by their coalition partners, and, in any event, the
coalition between these nonrepeat players is likely to be unstable.
If the promise to gain retroactive compensation is not credible,
then the parties might agree to enforceable contracts. The targets of
the second step of regulation might simply contract to indemnify the
losers in the first step for the cost of the political campaign or, more
remarkably, for the cost of earlier compliance—for example, the expenses incurred to install the ramps previously required. Alternatively, they might promise to pay only if they succeed in halting the incrementalist attack but do not gain retroactive compensation from the
government. These are risky contracts for the store owners to sign because they remove the incentive for aggressive political action on the
part of the already regulated party. A better contract might provide
for partial compensation so that all the parties have reason to push for
the results that they respectively seek. This example assumes that legislation rarely will compensate for the step-one mandates and burdens
but not for the step-two regulation, though that risk could also be minimized by contract.
I have hardly exhausted the possibilities here, but it is clear that the
problem of incrementalism is greater, though not insoluble, when earlystage compliance involves irretrievable investments. And it is useful to
repeat that whatever the level of irreversibility, the incrementalism
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problem is a possibility and not a fact. If it is efficient (or right or fair)
to ban smoking everywhere, then we should celebrate the ability of
advocates to get us closer to that optimum by taking on interest
groups one at a time. If reversibility by compensation is intriguing, it
is because this compensation does not undo socially efficient regulation.
II. LEARNING ON THE SLOPES
An obvious and important argument for incremental change,
whether by legislation, judicial decision, or regulation, is that we often
learn from experience. Lawmakers, and even the most avid proponents of drug legalization, might think it wise to begin with the legalization of marijuana alone in order to assess substitution effects, use by
minors, and other consequences of legalization. An incremental approach might overcome political opposition, but a secondary, expected benefit is that the design of a second step is likely to reflect lessons learned from the first. A familiar pair, or entanglement, begins
with a claim by opponents of a regulation that a given proposal starts
down a slippery slope toward an endpoint that most citizens or legislators would regard as abhorrent. There will be cases, real or imagined,
where the first step will indeed lead eventually to this endpoint because of intransitivity, political exhaustion, coordination problems, or
28
adherence to precedent. In turn, advocates for the proposed regulation might say, first, that every good law occupies a compromise position between unattractive extremes, such that mention of the slippery
slope and its endpoint is a mere scare tactic, and second, that there is
learning from experience on the slope itself. We may not know at the
outset where the social optimum is located, but it is normally sensible
to gather information and then to reevaluate the likely costs and benefits of further regulation (or deregulation). As we will see, irreversibility also plays a role in this argument. Lost in all this is the idea that
28

For a catalogue of path-dependent accounts, see Volokh, supra note 10, at 103334, 1051-52, 1052 n.71. Volokh tells several stories in which small, incremental steps
may lead to larger regulations that are initially undesired. For example, the effects of
gun registration might appear to be too small to merit a defense, but small steps may
nevertheless aggregate to regulation that would be highly objectionable. Id. at 1033.
Registration might “create political momentum” for gun control. Id. (emphasis omitted). Registration might reconfigure the opposition to gun control if fewer people
own guns as a result. Id. For example, registration may lower the cost of confiscation,
which could be a principal point of opposition to confiscation. Id. at 1033-34. Implementing confiscation might become constitutional where it previously was not because
the registration system can provide probable cause to search the houses of all registered gun owners. Id. at 1034.
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the value of experimentation does not necessarily translate into a
good argument for learning through incrementalism.
Consider a favorite example of the “slippery slopers”: gun control. Advocates of gun control might favor a first step of registration
and licensing, but their opponents will raise the specter of the slippery
slope and argue, among other things, that registration will make com29
plete confiscation easier. Confiscation of all firearms in the hands of
30
Advocates might
private citizens is anathema to most audiences.
then claim that easy ownership of assault weapons and pocket-size
handguns cannot possibly survive cost-benefit analysis; opponents will
disagree and may intuit that every step down the slope weakens the
likely configuration of defenders ready to halt the next step on the
path to confiscation. Advocates might also claim that a jurisdiction
will learn a good deal from regulation. If licensing or a ban on assault
weapons leads to a dramatic reduction in violent crime, then there
might be more support for further restrictions; if licensing instead
leads to a serious increase in home burglaries and firearm theft, then
a case might be made for requiring firearms to be kept under lock
and key. Most businesses and individuals engage in a kind of search,
or experimental process, before committing to major changes, and
there is every reason to think that governments ought to do the same.
In principle, opponents might respond to the argument about
learning from regulation by extracting a promise from advocates, however unenforceable, that if, for example, a ban on fully automatic weapons does not produce an x percent improvement in some stated
measure, then they must forswear a ban on semiautomatic weapons and
perhaps even agree to rescind the first step—the ban on fully automatic
weapons. The promise might be slightly more convincing if the experimental ban were legislated with a sunset provision. Similarly, consider
a ban on smoking in bars that is opposed, in part, by bar owners who
fear a reduction in patronage and claim more generally that tourism
and convention business will wilt. Advocates who argue that a substantial health gain could be enjoyed at low cost might agree to rescind the
ban if alcohol sales or the hotel occupancy rate dropped by more than

29

Id. at 1033-34.
See, e.g., Jon S. Vernick et al., Public Opinion Polling on Gun Policy, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1993, at 203 (reporting that sixty-four percent of poll respondents opposed a
total gun ban); Marjorie Connelly, Public Supports Stricter Gun Control Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1999, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/national/082699poll-watch.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (“The poll found only about a third of the public endorsed
a ban on the sale of all handguns, with 61 percent opposed . . . .”).
30
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five percent. One way to advance the rescission promise is to recognize
that if the health benefits could eventually be shown to exceed those
projected by the advocates, it is almost certain that a subsequent, wider
ban would be proposed.
The absence of such promises might reflect their unenforceability,
but it might also suggest that learning from regulation is largely a rhetorical device. Very few advocates suggest sunset provisions or agree at
the outset that the law ought to be revoked if the benefits of a regulation fall short of some stated expectation. Perhaps this is because data
rarely influence the most passionate advocates and interest groups,
whose positions usually reflect very strong preferences rather than the
efficient position for the population at large. If a local ban on smoking in bars produces a dramatic decrease in patronage and tax revenues from alcohol sales, then advocates of the ban are unlikely to apologize and say that their cost-benefit claims were wrong. They might
believe that smokers moved to outdoor cafés or other unregulated locations and might propose that the ban ought to be extended to new
venues. Owners of bars do not internalize the nation’s healthcare
costs, and the American Medical Association—a surprisingly late31
arriving advocate for smoking bans —does not take responsibility for
32
local tax revenues or the profits of tavern keepers.
Learning from regulation sometimes suggests careful experimentation rather than legal incrementalism. Indeed, the idea that states
might be laboratories suggests not so much incrementalism as somewhat controlled, dramatic experiments. In the case of access ramps, it
would be useful to have data about the frequency of use and impact of
ramps on workforce participation by disabled persons. A structured
experiment might do this best. But, again, data matter more to agnostic citizens and nonpartisan lawmakers than to passionate advocates.
If there were no significant workforce effect, then advocates might

31

See Alan Blum & Howard Wolinsky, AMA Rewrites Tobacco History, 346 LANCET
261, 261 (1995) (“Today’s AMA should be commended for attempting to tackle the
tobacco pandemic. But it should be remembered that this organisation is a latecomer
to the war.”).
32
Both groups might care about the health of employees in bars and restaurants,
but such employees might self-select. It is interesting that neither advocates nor opponents of smoking bans produce evidence of the sentiments of the employees. See generally H. Tang et al., Changes of Knowledge, Attitudes, Beliefs, and Preference of Bar Owner
and Staff in Response to a Smoke-Free Bar Law, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 87 (2004) (concluding that the popularity of California’s smoke-free bar law increased over time, “even
among bar owners and employees”).
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note the importance of more accessible public transportation in
bringing disabled employees to accommodating workplaces.
In other settings, drastic changes might be more instructive than
incremental ones. A single month or year in which smoking was
banned everywhere in one jurisdiction, in all eating and lodging establishments within it, or in all places on a rotating basis might yield
useful data. Learning from regulation is a good argument for change
and experimentation, but it is not always, or even often, an argument
for incremental change, especially where incrementalism operates on
the legal system as a whole rather than on one or two jurisdictions as
33
proving grounds.
Learning through incrementalism seems most likely where the social or political optimum is widely understood to be in a specified
range such that there is little support for either endpoint of what
might otherwise be a slippery slope. Consider cases of minimum-age
regulation. Countries differ as to the appropriate minimum ages for
34
drinking alcohol, driving, voting, and other rights and privileges;
apart from a few reconstructed prohibitionists, however, no one seriously espouses the notion that these minima ought to be in the thirties or forties. Incrementalism thus seems like the way to discover the
“right” age at which one might be permitted to purchase alcoholic beverages. But here, too, partisans will disagree about the lessons to be
drawn from experience. Imagine that advocates succeed in legislating
a drinking age of nineteen, where it had previously been eighteen,
with the claim that a higher age will reduce fatal automobile accidents, inasmuch as many of those are associated with alcohol consumption. If the new drinking age does not then bring about a substantial decrease in fatalities, advocates might say that nineteen-yearolds purchased alcoholic beverages for their younger friends and
classmates or perhaps that cashiers and bartenders mistook eighteenyear-olds for older patrons. Advocates will agitate for a higher drinking age of twenty or twenty-one, with the conviction that the new restriction will reduce accidents. Of course, every categorical removal of
33

See Listokin, supra note 1, at 483, 533-39 (describing the value of high-variance
experiments, especially when they are reversible). But reversibility for Listokin is not
limited to compliance costs and is not at all focused on its role in creating or blocking
political coalitions. Id. at 533-34.
34
Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.”), with Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [COST.] art. 56(1) (Italy) (setting the minimum voting age for Senate
elections at twenty-five).
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drinkers—or drivers—will reduce the number of unwanted drivers. It
might be that a ban on drinking applied to everyone under eighteen,
and then to twenty-five-year-olds as well, would reduce fatalities as
much as a prohibition attached to everyone under nineteen. Moreover, a policy driven by cost-benefit analysis would consider driving age
as well as drinking age, though the private and social cost of an incrementally higher driving age will strike most lawmakers as greater
than the cost of a year without alcohol. The latter is especially difficult to quantify. In any event, advocates rarely seem interested in experiments that would illuminate cost-benefit calculations of this kind.
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) is likely to attach little value
to the utility some people get from drinking. Similarly, McDonald’s
employs many high-school students and sells food to a young audience, so it benefits from a low driving age and is unlikely to internalize the benefits of higher driving ages as it wields its political power.
Then there is the more obvious possibility that the lesson from
regulation will be that a drinking age of nineteen rather than eighteen does indeed significantly decrease fatalities. If so, there will be
pressure to raise the age further to twenty, and so on, until the returns
from doing so seem modest. If there were no evidence of a declining
return as the minimum age increased, lawmakers might return to the
minimum age of eighteen or even try seventeen because of interestgroup pressure. The rhetoric or heartfelt arguments would include
the point that it is unfair to restrict the freedom of eighteen-year-olds
when the benefit is no greater than doing the same for other ages.
Lawmakers may simply look for some political equilibrium where no
organized interest has an enormous stake in the result. If so, this
would be a case in which the learning-from-regulation argument offers significant support for incrementalism, though perhaps not for
reasons normally contemplated.
In sum, useful experiments come in disparate sizes, in the sense
that one does not always wish for a variable to move in small steps.
The argument for limiting law to modest experiments must be based
on asymmetrical error costs or irreversibility. But this is not the place
for a full exploration of the distribution of error costs or for a conclusion as to when incrementalism is the best means of experimentation.
Incrementalism has been lauded with no specification of exactly when
it is desirable. My aim is simply to show that incrementalism comes
with baggage and that the baggage is heaviest when there is irreversibility. We can now add the observation that larger, more dramatic
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changes do not necessarily impose greater and more irreversible costs
because useful experiments come in several sizes.
III. COMPENSATION AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS
A. Undercompensation and Overcompensation
The discussion in Part I emphasized the importance of irreversibility in understanding the problem with incrementalism. If irreversible costs were imposed on one interest group at step one, then that
group would have no reason to join in a common defense against further regulation at step two (unless the second step threatens additional costs on the interest group burdened earlier). Indeed, it might favor the regulation of its competitors at step two, either to raise their
marginal costs or to drive some out of business. But it was suggested
that seemingly irreversible regulations could indeed be reversed, at
least from the perspective of the directly burdened party, if compensation were retroactively provided. If a property owner must retrofit a
building with an access ramp costing $300,000, and the ramp brings in
new business with a present value of $50,000, then compensation of
$250,000 will leave the owner as well off as before. Even if competing
owners are not required to construct ramps, there will be neither envy
nor competitive disadvantage. This compensation could be provided
at step one, but that is the stuff of a very broad takings law. By contrast, it could be offered as part of a legislative package at step two.
Compensation could come from the interest group at risk at step two,
when that group seeks a defensive alliance, or it could come from the
government if the allied groups succeed in obtaining retroactive compensation. Either way, the prospect of compensation might encourage a burdened party to join forces in opposing further regulation. If
the government, or an advocacy group, is thus stopped in its incrementalist path, we might say, or wish, that the advocates (and more
passive government constituents if they bear the financial burden of
compensation) are penalized for pushing too far past the social optimum. Thus, they may be deterred from overreaching with their strategic incrementalism. A more straightforward idea is that interest
groups that were once divided are now encouraged to form the alliance they “ought” to have formed in the first place in order to defend against the overachieving advocates.
These perspectives are overly simplistic. The possibility of compensation complicates everything about incrementalism, the political
process, and lawmaking. In this Part, the focus is on the political
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process, and especially on power politics involving interest groups,
where the larger question is which rules of engagement are most likely
to produce good laws. If there is an incrementalism problem, and if
compensation is part of the solution needed to align interest groups
in a way that produces good law, then the important questions are (1)
when to provide compensation and (2) whether to do so in a discretionary or mandatory fashion. In time, the discussion shifts away from
power politics and toward the question of inefficiency, or rent seeking. At times, the analysis tracks that which is appropriate to a discussion of takings law, retroactivity, or both; the novelty of the discussion
here is preserved by focusing on the case for and against incrementalism.
In the interest of reducing the number of balls in the air, I adhere
to the remarkably and absurdly simplifying assumption that compen35
sation will be correctly calculated. Unfortunately, much complexity
remains. Compensation may be perfect, or even generous, but a
property owner will recognize that she is sometimes better off if the
government regulates or takes the property of others and allows her
property to flourish because of the new government project or regulation. In these cases, we must again be anxious about the incentives to
encourage or to discourage government interventions and to craft
them one way or the other. From the government’s perspective, even
if compensation were perfectly calculated, there will always be budget
constraints, and governments usually cannot collect from those who
will benefit from the legal intervention. Though I try to set these considerations aside because they are associated with all government interventions, rather than solely those that reflect incrementalism, they

35

If this be not so, then incrementalism is but a small problem in a larger, more
distressing picture of government regulation and takings. When compensation is
known to be ungenerous, affected parties can be expected to litigate and lobby to
avoid having property or business interests regulated or condemned; if voluntary purchases by the government—in the shadow of expected regulation or eminent domain
proceedings—are also ungenerous, then private property owners will expend resources to forestall government projects. On the other hand, where compensation in
excess of the private owner’s valuation is expected, there will be a push to have one’s
property taken (or one’s business regulated) if the regulation is severe enough that it
amounts to a compensable taking. At the same time, if payments required of the government affect its inclination or ability to regulate or to undertake projects (as will
surely be the case if the beneficiary of the government’s action is made to pay in one
form or another), then we can expect a reduction in interventions. Correspondingly,
if the government can capture gains from beneficiaries while it undercompensates losers, we can expect more intervention, unless the losers who could not extract more
compensation are somehow relatively adept at blocking the government’s interventions. All this complexity can be avoided with the assumption of accurate compensation.
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come into play when compensation is an ingredient in a suggested antidote to the incrementalism problem.
B. Power Politics
Thus far, compensation has been used to undo irreversibility and,
in turn, to reduce the incrementalism problem. It can, however, play
a more important role if we make assumptions about the desirable
constellation of interest groups. A starting point of public-choice
theory is that a well-organized interest group is likely to overachieve at
the expense of dispersed interests, or losers. The academic literature
emphasizes the obvious problem of a group’s gaining too much of
36
something; there is, however, an additional problem with regard to
the form of government activity. For example, it is not simply that the
military budget will be larger because of the efforts of well-organized
contractors but also that it is likely to be organized around particular
pieces of new equipment or military bases that benefit particular interests but may be suboptimal.
A suggested antidote to this process problem is to set well37
matched interest groups against one another. For example, if teachers’ salaries were to be funded by a tax on milk, or milk subsidies required a reduction in the education budget, or perhaps both, then
dairy farmers and public school teachers might lobby and even
present useful information to the legislature. A fair fight might allow
unattached legislators to resolve the matter in the public’s interest. A
skeptic might wonder why interest groups would abide by the rules of
battle, inasmuch as those rules could be altered by legislation. There
is also the question why well-matched opponents should be expected
to leave a desirable result on the battlefield. But a guarded optimist
could think that there will be pressure to abide by the rule of wellmatched opponents and that the outcome of such a battle is likely to
be superior to the outcome that would obtain if either organized
interest was able to operate at the expense of a dispersed, disorganized interest. A true optimist might look to campaign-finance
reform, education, and a free press to make interest-group activity
useless when not directed toward helping the polity find socially de36

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 57
tbl.1.1 (4th ed. 2007) (charting the costs and benefits of various legislative processes);
MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS
IN LAW 251-54 (2009) (discussing the “demand side” of legislative goods).
37
See Tullock, supra note 4, at 46 (proposing the notion that if interest groups
were pitted against one another, the allocation of resources would be more efficient).
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sirable outcomes, but a pragmatic optimist is prepared to look for a
second-best power-politics process. Finally, another interesting possibility is that it may be easier for voters or public-spirited lawmakers to
assess the strength of interest groups than to locate social optima
more directly. Even an enlightened lawmaker may be unsure where
to ban smoking; the same lawmaker may do well to leave it to associations representing owners of different kinds of establishments and to
the American Cancer Society to bargain for the “optimal” ban or to
battle for votes in one city council after another in order to set the
rules. The case for arranged battle is not unlike that in favor of the
adversary system in litigation, where the hope must also be that competition between advocates will produce the right result.
With this in mind, we can revisit the history of smoking bans. Advocates may not have been terribly well organized when they began
investing in political activity, but an early target was airline cabins, as
to which the opposition was dispersed, though perhaps no more so
38
than the advocates. Following a period during which airlines agreed
to nonsmoking sections, legislation proceeded incrementally over the
course of a decade, first by prohibiting smoking on domestic flights
under two hours, then on those shorter than six hours, and finally, in
39
2000, on all domestic flights. The airlines had little reason to fight
these bans because smokers could not migrate to unregulated close
substitutes. At the local level, smoking bans did not follow a single
path, but a ban on pipes and cigars in some venues was followed by a
more complete ban on smoking in restaurants, which was often followed by a proposal to extend the ban to bars, then to hotels, then to
parks and beaches in some jurisdictions, and, in several jurisdictions,
40
to all indoor places except private residences. In some jurisdictions,
bans began with office buildings, where secondhand smoke was seen
as a matter of employment conditions; there, again, the losers would
38

See Steven A. Mirmina, Aviation Safety and Security—Legal Developments, 63 J. AIR L.
& COM. 547, 558-59 (1998) (charting the history of nonsmoking sections and smoking
bans on airlines).
39
See id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 41706(a) (2006) (prohibiting smoking on all
domestic flights).
40
California, for example, pursued aggressive regulation of smoking in public
places. It passed the Smoke-Free Act in 1994, prohibiting smoking in all places of employment. Ch. 310, 1994 Cal. Stat. 2055 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 6404.5 (West 2003)). Some of California’s cities have passed yet more stringent local
laws. The city of Calabasas, for example, prohibits smoking in all indoor and outdoor
areas of the city, except for a handful of designated smoking areas. CALABASAS, CAL.,
CODE § 8.12.040(A)–(B) (2009), available at http://www.municode.com/Resources/
gateway.asp?pid=16235&sid=5.
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have been dispersed employees not championed by any organized
41
business interest. An idealist might say that, in incrementalist fashion, the law found its way to the social optimum, which varies across
disparate jurisdictions. An optimistic public-choice theorist might say
that although we are uncertain of the optimal intervention, at least
similarly empowered interest groups were eventually pitted against
one another and, apparently, equilibrium was reached. We might
think of this as politically optimal or at least as reflecting the best we
can expect of power politics in the real world.
I return now to the idea of reversal through compensation.
Imagine again that restaurant owners lose on their own at step one,
but then bar owners, when threatened at step two, induce restaurant
owners, and perhaps unregulated hotel owners as well, to join in the
defense. The coalition succeeds, in this hypothetical, in preserving
smoke-friendly drinking establishments and also in reversing the ban
on smoking in restaurants. Indeed, this reversal was “promised” to the
restaurant owners as the reward for their participation in this round of
power politics. If the reversal seems implausible, consider the reversal
of regulations regarding motorcycle helmets in some states (and the
42
increase in highway speed limits after they were reduced) and the vo41

See, e.g., Act of July 5, 1989, ch. 244, sec. 5, § 1399-o, 1989 N.Y. Laws 2328, 2329-34
(codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (McKinney 2002 & Supp.
2009)) (banning smoking in all enclosed workplaces). The present law, however, exempts (1) private homes and automobiles, (2) hotel and motel rooms, (3) retail tobacco
businesses, (4) private clubs, (5) cigar bars, (6) outdoor areas of restaurants and bars,
and (7) enclosed rooms in restaurants, bars, convention halls, and so forth, when hosting
private functions organized for the promotion and sampling of tobacco products. N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-q (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009). This law amended the prior
law, which in 2003 had banned smoking in most indoor areas open to the public. Cf. Act
of Mar. 26, 2003, ch. 13, sec. 4, § 1399-q, 2003 N.Y. Laws 109, 113-14 (codified as
amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-q (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009)).
42
For example, in Florida,
a person over 21 years of age may operate or ride upon a motorcycle without
wearing protective headgear securely fastened upon his or her head if such
person is covered by an insurance policy providing for at least $10,000 in medical benefits for injuries incurred as a result of a crash while operating or riding on a motorcycle.
FLA. STAT. § 316.211(3)(b) (2009). This section amended the prior Florida law, which
had required all motorcyclists to wear protective headgear. Act of June 16, 1971, ch.
71-135, § 316.287, 1971 Fla. Laws 431, 543 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 316.211(3)(b)).
At the federal level, states were initially required to lower their highway speed limits to fifty-five miles per hour in order to receive certain federal funds. Emergency
Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 1046, 1046-47
(1974), repealed by National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
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latility of depreciation schedules in the Internal Revenue Code; reversals are not terribly uncommon, especially if we think of deregulation as reversal. If restaurant smoking were to be permitted once
more, then one could argue that the earlier ban on smoking in restaurants was the product of a divide-and-conquer strategy eventually
44
revealed to have been an instance of the incrementalism problem.
Reversal through compensation, or compensation in the event of
regulatory reversal, can be justified by thinking about behavior in the
shadow of retroactive lawmaking. For example, following a tightening
of pollution laws, there is the provocative argument that polluters can
be encouraged to anticipate (rather than battle) more demanding environmental laws, which would hold the polluters liable for injuries
that would have been avoided had they abided by the standards subsequently set. Similarly, advocates of smoking bans—though much
harder to identify than emitters of particular pollutants—should perhaps compensate the restaurant owners if the ban is reversed. The argument will seem a strange one, especially because its logic also suggests that when the same smoking ban was first instituted, the
restaurant owners should themselves have owed damages for failing to
ban smoking in the years prior to the ban, bounded only by the sta45
tute of limitations. Both applications of the logic suffer from the
59, § 205(d)(1), 109 Stat. 568, 577. The law was modified by Congress in the late 1980s
to increase the limit to sixty-five miles per hour on certain roads, see Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 174, 101
Stat. 132, 218, but then repealed in 1995, returning the issue completely to the states,
see National Highway System Designation Act § 205(d)(1). Since that time many states
have raised their speed limits, though uniformity is still lacking. See, e.g., Robert E.
King & Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158-62
(1999) (examining the federal maximum speed limit’s effect on Montana’s legislative
effort to replace speed limits with a law requiring drivers to operate their vehicles at a
“reasonable” speed). For example, the current speed limit on interstate highways in
Idaho is seventy-five miles per hour. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-654(2)(c) (2008). In Illinois, the limit is sixty-five miles per hour. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-601 (2008).
43
See generally John P. Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TAX L.
REV. 483 (1985) (reviewing the history of accelerating and tightening depreciation deductions as well as the related investment tax credit).
44
Note that this reversal-by-compensation strategy is applied here even though a
smoking ban, unlike a ramp requirement, does not represent an irreversible investment. See supra note 17 (discussing the irreversibility of a ramp requirement).
45
If this argument is fashioned as a takings claim, then we need some baseline
understanding of property rights and smoking rights. As a tort claim, it is unconvincing because the primary wrongdoers are the smokers (or tobacco companies) and not
the owners of facilities in which secondhand smoke is experienced. Still, there remains the idea developed in the retroactivity, or legal-transitions, literature that retroactive liability will discourage parties with superior information about desirable legal change from lobbying or otherwise working against improvements in law. See Louis
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problem of identifying who, exactly, ought to pay. But this is not the
place to puzzle over the literature on retroactivity, and I prefer instead
to emphasize that selective compensation might continue to be favored on the instrumentalist ground that it encourages the earlier losers (here the restaurant owners) to form a coalition with those later
threatened (here the bar owners) exactly as they might have done in
the earlier time period had a collective action problem or a misapprehension about the path of regulation not interfered.
If mandatory compensation for regulatory reversals can improve
power politics, there remains the question whether it is feasible. Law
has struggled with the question how to define and compensate regulatory takings, and it has struggled with rules that might be regarded as
46
arbitrary. Compensation for burdensome regulations only if reversed,
or only for those reversed after subsequent, incrementally more severe
regulations are voted on, presents considerable difficulties. No legal

Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 551-52 (1986)
(showing that transition rules, including retroactivity, can enforce the legal system’s
goals); Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657,
1658-59 (1999) (elaborating the argument that parties with information can be encouraged to anticipate legal change through retroactive liability and other means). A
major problem with this argument is that it raises the stakes associated with change
and might actually lead interest groups to block progress rather than to accelerate it.
Note that the description in the text passes over the puzzle of why choice is so
rarely offered in the absence of legal intervention. Why, in other words, are nonsmokers so powerful politically yet so weak in the marketplace that they could rarely be satisfied by entrepreneurs who sorted them by offering nonsmoking environments?
46
The Supreme Court has stated that
[t]he question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. While this
Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole,” this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula”
for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)). As for the rules themselves, there is, for example, the permanent-physicalpresence test articulated in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419
(1982). Under this rule, a taking will be found if the governmental action imposes “a
permanent physical occupation of property,” irrespective of whether the regulation
secures a public policy benefit or “has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”
Id. at 434-35. Similarly, there is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which holds that
a taking may be found when the state deprives a property owner of “all economically
beneficial uses of the land.” 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
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system calculates and awards damages arising out of a regulation like a
smoking ban when there is a safety claim and when net losses to restaurateurs and other property owners are difficult to assess. Similarly, the
burden of gun registration or the private cost of a prohibition on small
handguns or assault weapons is difficult to calculate. The net losses of
an age cohort that was “wrongly” denied the right to engage in an activity are even more difficult to calculate. The compensation solution to
the problem of incrementalism seems feasible only for a subset of cases,
and it is not a subset particularly rich in reversals.
Moreover, the feasibility issue is not limited to damage assessments. There are significant difficulties in identifying reversals of prior
policies. A freeze in the minimum wage, despite inflation, might be a
reversal. Many changes in tax law, including changes in rates and depreciation schedules, necessarily reverse prior law. Some might view a
regulatory regime requiring elevators rather than access ramps as a
regulatory reversal, while others might view it as a further step in the
regulatory trajectory. The problem is real as well as pecuniary because
interest groups will have reason to tweak legislation in order to create
a regulatory reversal where they would not otherwise have wanted one
or, on the other side, to frame legislation so that it is not deemed a reversal in order to avoid the compensation requirement. For example,
lawmakers required passive-restraint systems in automobiles on the
47
way to requiring airbags. Once airbags were required, auto-engaging
48
seatbelts were no longer mandatory. If this were to be regarded as a
reversal, so that compensation for the passive-restraint step would be
required, then the airbag regulation might have taken a less efficient
49
form in order to avoid the compensation requirement.
Finally, in many cases, the problem of identifying regulatory reversals and that of measuring damages run together and make the compensation solution infeasible. Licensing requirements in any profession may become incrementally more burdensome, yet each new
burden also raises the barrier against new competitors. Clients might
be the group most deserving of compensation, but we do not think of
them as implicated in the divide-and-conquer problem.

47

See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, subsecs. S4.1.4, S4.1.5.3 (2008) (mandating that passiverestraint systems be installed in all cars manufactured after September 1, 1989, and
mandating airbag installation in all cars manufactured after September 1, 1997).
48
See id. § 571.208, subsec. S4.1.5.3 (permitting the passive-restraint requirement
to be met with airbags alone).
49
The law might have given manufacturers a choice, even though airbags were
superior and bifurcation might have sacrificed some economies of scale.
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In short, compensation is in theory a tool with which to alleviate
the incrementalism problem, especially when irreversibility is present.
Once we move away from the easiest cases, however, it is as difficult to
identify regulatory reversals (as well as to assess net damages) as it is to
pinpoint problems with incrementalism. A respectable case can surely
be made for compensation following regulatory reversals—with an eye
toward getting the power politics right in the first place—as it is comparable to the argument for compensating all apparent regulatory takings. But the argument is almost surely too complicated: execution is
too difficult, and there remains the question whether compensation
ought to be paid by taxpayers (in which case there will likely be insufficient opposition to a regulatory reversal), by advocates (past or
present), or by previous beneficiaries. Compensation might in theory
solve the incrementalism problem, but it is a theory unlikely to translate into practice.
C. Discretionary Compensation and Unproblematic Minimum-Age Legislation
Nothing stops the political process, including bargaining among
interest groups, from producing compensation for some regulatory reversals. Just as a government sometimes buys property rights when it
could have achieved its ends by regulating without paying compensation under the Fifth Amendment, so, too, can a government, or
another interest group, compensate ramp builders or other earlier
losers, even though it need not do so. It is unusual for a government
to pay for past compliance with its rules but not so unusual for it to
pay for new regulations—especially because it can normally substitute
direct activity for mandates. Thus, the government can provide air
marshals on commercial airline flights, or it can require airlines to
50
provide certified security personnel. It can require airlines to provide the seats for these marshals, though it could have advanced the
cause of security and the economic health of the airlines by buying
51
tickets for the marshals. A government that requires airbags, smoke
alarms, or vaccinations can presumably offer to supply them as well.
This point about discretionary compensation will seem more
plausible if the likelihood of payment through a kind of logroll is included in the calculus. A government might require airbags at the automakers’ expense, but it might in the same legislative breath, or ses50

Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 1544.223(b) (2009) (requiring commercial carriers to provide
seats for federal air marshals).
51
Cf. id. § 1544.223(c) (requiring air marshals’ seats to be provided free of charge).
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sion, buy more vehicles than expected for its own fleet. Moreover, the
government might change the tax law regarding net-operating-loss
carryovers in a way that benefits these losers. In any event, there are
good, if counterintuitive, reasons for unfunded mandates, especially
52
where powerful interest groups are concerned.
It is noteworthy that our experience with discretionary compensation is consistent with the thinking offered here on troubling incrementalism. Following an increase in the drinking age, no political system is likely to compensate those who must now wait longer to drink.
Interestingly, step-by-step changes with respect to such minimum-age
rules are free from the incrementalism problem. That no one—even
among those who think that they can distinguish derisible slippery
slopes from necessary compromise among interests and values—
regards minimum-age legislation as played out on a slippery slope is
perhaps a clue rather than an oversight. Minimum-age legislation is
likely free of the incrementalism problem because it does not divide
and conquer defending groups. Advocates did succeed in raising the
minimum drinking age from eighteen to nineteen, then from nine53
teen to twenty, and finally to twenty-one. But there are a few reasons
why this is different from incremental building-code changes and
smoking bans. First, a single age cohort is generally not a well-

52

See generally Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 351 (1999) (examining the positive attributes of unfunded
mandates). An important feature of Professor Roin’s discussion is the political power
of states and localities. See id. at 378 (“State and local governments, or the interests
that they tax or service, may balance or offset those interest groups that stand to gain
from intergovernmental mandates.”). In particular, she focuses on the ability of state
and local governments to form coalitions as repeat players and to organize in the halls
of Congress. See id. at 379 (“Indeed, these subordinate governments might lobby for
funded—or, of course, for overfunded—mandates when there is . . . some political
gain to a claim that the federal government forced certain policies on the states and
localities . . . .”). This power might explain why the incrementalism problem does not
often arise by dividing and conquering jurisdictions.
53
Wisconsin, for example, lowered its drinking age to eighteen in 1971. Act of
Mar. 22, 1972, § 5, 1971 Wis. Sess. Laws 509, 510 (current version at WIS. STAT.
§ 125.02(8m) (2009)). Prior to that time, the drinking age had been twenty-one for all
wine and spirits. Id. It was raised to nineteen in 1984, see Act of Nov. 3, 1983, § 5, 1983
Wis. Sess. Laws 786, 787 (current version at WIS. STAT. § 125.02(8m)) (raising the
drinking age to nineteen effective July 1, 1984), and to twenty-one in 1986, see Act of
June 7, 1986, §§ 4, 55, 1985 Wis. Sess. Laws 1484, 1484, 1493 (current version at WIS.
STAT. § 125.02(8m)) (adjusting the minimum drinking age to twenty-one and grandfathering in nineteen- and twenty-year-olds). See WIS. STAT. § 125.02(8m) (defining the
current legal drinking age as twenty-one).
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organized political interest. Second, to the extent that other interest
groups are organized and serve as proxies for others, such as bar owners serving as proxies for eighteen-year-olds who wish to drink, these
other interests are not divisible. After all, no identifiable set of taverns
specializes in serving eighteen-year-olds, and, even in college towns,
no bar owners would be expected to turn, in a second regulatory step,
against other bars able to serve nineteen-year-olds. To the extent that
vendors of alcohol are the organized interest in play, minimum-age
legislation does not present an incrementalism problem because the
relevant interest group is not divisible in the same manner as restaurants and bars, or owners of new buildings and old buildings.
There is a third and final reason why minimum-age legislation,
though historically incrementalist, does not run into the incrementalism
problem. Even if we think of each age cohort as an interest group,
their disorganization could be overcome at the polls if each cohort
had millions of voters likely to take their drinking rights seriously. If
citizens born in 1960 found in 1979 that they would have to wait
another year to purchase alcoholic beverages, they might have been
expected to seek revenge against the legislators who raised the minimum age, especially if the age had been raised more than once at the
cohort’s expense. In fact, legislators enacted multiple, staggered increases in the minimum drinking age in one step and postponed ef55
fective dates so that those old enough to vote had no objection. In

54

I leave aside a hypothetical assault on sixty-five-year-olds, who might be well
represented by the AARP.
55
Even in those states with the most frequent changes, there has not been a progression that looks like a divide-and-conquer strategy. Georgia, for example, legislated twenty-one as the minimum age for purchasing alcohol in 1938 (after the end of Prohibition
in 1933, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI). See Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages and Liquors, No. 297, § 15, 1937–1938 Ga. Laws 103, 118-19 (1938)
(current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23 (2003 & Supp. 2009)) (prohibiting the sale of
alcoholic beverages to minors); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-104 (1937) (setting twenty-one as
the age of majority). In 1972, Georgia lowered the age of majority to eighteen (this was a
period in which drinking ages and voting ages dropped to conform to the age for military conscription). See Act of Mar. 10, 1972, No. 862, sec. 1, § 74-104, 1972 Ga. Laws 193,
194-95 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23). In 1980, Georgia again raised the
age of majority, and thus the drinking age, to nineteen. See Act of Apr. 13, 1981, No. 732,
sec. 22, § 5A-510, 1981 Ga. Laws 1269, 1281-83 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-323). Finally, in 1985, Georgia raised the age to twenty-one (to take effect in 1986) in anticipation of a federal regulation. See Act of Apr. 3, 1985, No. 562, sec. 3, § 3-3-23, 1985
Ga. Laws 753, 755-57 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23). The minimum age
was set at twenty for the 1985 transition year. See id. Effective dates were always set such
that no cohort ever lost the ability to purchase alcoholic beverages. Therefore, no two
cohorts were divided by the proposed effective dates. The pattern is best described as
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short, although a young cohort might wish it had worked against a series of changes long before it attained voting age, there was not
another cohort from which it could have been divided and conquered—and certainly not another that would have been expected to
turn on it once itself regulated. The incrementalism problem thus
gives us a nice way to understand why minimum-age legislation has
not seemed as troubling to the slippery slopers as, for example, gun
56
control.
Consider in this regard two kinds of incrementalism in the area of
employment-discrimination law. The first concerns a statute that applies to employers with more than x employees, but, over time,
57
amendments broaden its reach to employers with fewer employees.
When large employers are targeted in the first step, family-owned
businesses and local chambers of commerce stay out of the fray. Indeed, they might regard the legislation as welcome because it increases costs for their most threatening competitors. The second kind of
incrementalism involves an expansion of protected classes by statute,
regulation, or judicial decision. A statute that permitted employment
claims with respect to race and sex might over time add pregnancy,
58
sexual preference, and age as relevant characteristics. This may be

legislating an increase in the drinking age without disappointing the expectations of any
cohort already old enough to vote.
56
In the case of gun control, one would not expect the losers in an early step to
turn and support more regulation in a subsequent step. But there is the potential for a
divide-and-conquer strategy if hunters care mostly about rifles and only support the
absolutist position because they need allies or believe that the slippery slope will consume their passion. In any event, it is not an incrementalism problem of the worst
kind because hunters and gun collectors, for example, are not competitors.
In the case of abortion rights, the slippery-slope claim is familiar but an incrementalism problem seems unlikely. Both sides in the debate are well organized. More importantly, voters are well-informed and involved, so legislation and judicial decisions
seem to reflect a political and legal equilibrium rather than an incrementalist strategy.
It is hard to see an interest on either side turning on its competitor.
57
Compare, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241,
253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)) (defining covered employers covered by Title VII to include those having twenty-five or more employees), with
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2(2), § 701(b),
86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) (extending the scope
of Title VII to employers with fifteen or more employees).
58
Compare, e.g., Civil Rights Act § 703, 78 Stat. at 255-57 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”), with Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-555, sec. 1, § 701(k), 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) (expanding discrimination on the basis of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy).
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incrementalism, but defenders (and even advocates) are unlikely to
divine the order in which these other protected classes will be added.
There is no constitutional or natural ordinal ranking of attributes or
classes. As such, they might underinvest in litigation or other defensive tactics. There is a small divide-and-conquer problem to the extent
that some employers, and even industries, are more at risk with respect to some attributes than others. But for the most part, the expanded protection affects the same employers, and there is no danger
that those who lost in the first round of legislation will favor further
regulation in a subsequent round. If there is neither irreversibility
nor shifting coalitions, then there is not an incrementalism problem.
By contrast, the expansion of coverage to smaller employers does
present an incrementalism problem, though not one made more severe by irreversibility (except that employment rights are rarely withdrawn). Ultimately, it seems that we should be more wary of incrementalism as applied to employer size than to protected classes of
employees.
D. Incrementalism and Rent Seeking
The discussion thus far has approached the incrementalism problem, and the use of compensation as an antidote, with interest-group
coalitions, or power politics, in mind. The root of the problem, as
identified and discussed in Part I, is that strategic incrementalism can
divide and conquer groups. It can then push regulation far beyond
the social optimum or perhaps regulate the “wrong” activities rather
than too many. One solution to this problem—realigning divided interest groups by promising compensation in the event of a regulatory
reversal—appears to be theoretically attractive but exceedingly difficult to design and execute. In this Section, the discussion turns away
from the previous focus on divided and then realigned interest groups
and toward the problem of interest-group activity itself. This problem
is often described as one of rent seeking, an expression that refers to
59
If interest
socially wasteful activity undertaken to influence law.

59

Rent seeking can be understood by beginning with the canonical case in which
the government has a monopoly to bestow, perhaps in the form of a license. If the
monopoly position is worth x dollars to the monopolist, a supplicant (or interest
group) would presumably pay as much as x-1 dollars to acquire the position. One
famous advance in public-choice theory was the realization that economists had underestimated the “problem with monopoly” by focusing only on the deadweight loss
caused by the monopolist who sells less of a good, at a price higher than marginal cost,
than would sellers in a competitive market. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
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groups know that compensation is available, they will expend resources, or seek economic rents, in attempts to recover their costs,
though these costs have passed under the metaphorical bridge.
One way to combat this waste would be to insist on the eradication
of discretionary compensation. A government would discourage rent
seeking if it could somehow precommit never to subsidize an industry
and never to impose licensing requirements or tariffs that protect an
industry. Although uncompensated takings surely generate rentseeking behavior, from a public-choice perspective, it is difficult to understand why scholars pay so much more attention to government tak60
ings than to government subsidies or other programs. The two can be
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 231-32 (1967) (explaining that welfare
loss from monopoly also comes from the resources producers spend successfully or
unsuccessfully trying to obtain a monopoly). Consumers who would be willing to pay
more than marginal cost might be denied the good because of the monopoly-pricing
strategy, even though it would be efficient to transfer the good to those consumers.
The public-choice insight is that the social cost of a monopoly is much greater than the
aggregated deadweight loss because it includes the cost of wasteful rent-seeking activity. Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807, 809-15 (1975) (modeling the social costs of monopoly “as the sum of
deadweight loss and the additional loss resulting from the competition to become a
monopolist”). The resulting cost could be as great as or even greater than the expected profit from monopoly status. It could exceed the profit, for example, if competition caused one who had invested, say, 0.5x dollars in quest of the monopoly (worth x
dollars) to regard that investment as a sunk cost, such that it was worth spending
another x-1 dollars at the margin to acquire the monopoly. In principle, there is no
upper limit on the total social loss that profit-maximizing entities competing for the
monopoly might generate.
If aspiring monopolists simply bid for the license by paying money, then we have a
mere transfer payment. In that case, there is no social waste apart from the deadweight loss attributable to monopoly pricing, though we might be offended if the government sold some things in this manner. Thus, if a cable channel is auctioned off to
the highest bidder, we might bemoan the loss of a medium for public television or
other noncommercial use, but at least the resource will have gone to the commercial
user who values it most highly. On the other hand, if a politician assigns the channel,
various broadcasters or other interests might try to influence the political decision with
campaign contributions, outright bribes, personal favors, paid “factfinding” trips, or
multiple-martini lunches. Some of these involve real waste; the politician is unlikely to
value the bloated lunch as much as it costs a supplicant to provide it, and a highly paid
job for the politician’s family member is unlikely to match that employee with a job
well suited to her skills. Rent seeking encompasses such waste. A plausible policy goal,
or source of a theory about law, might be to structure rules to minimize rent seeking
and thereby reduce social waste.
60
Government “givings” also present incrementalism problems, especially if the
givings, or benefits, are meant to produce reactions. I limit the discussion here to
burdens and will confront givings issues in future work, where judicial, rather than legislative, decisions are at the forefront. For the present, note that givings necessarily
come at a cost, and unless this cost is spread across dispersed taxpayers and citizens, it
will activate interest groups. In many settings, this effect is orthogonal to the incre-
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equally wasteful in rent-seeking terms. But much as the discussion here
considers regulatory reversals and other aspects of incrementalism
without reinventing the wheel of takings law, it is widely acknowledged
that governments can subsidize one group at the expense of others. It
may simply be too difficult to establish baselines from which unequal
subsidies would be barred. Nevertheless, unfunded mandates may be
acceptable or even desirable and, at the other extreme, a requirement
that mandates be treated as compensable takings might also be acceptable. The worst choice, from the rent-seeking perspective, is one that
allows interest groups to lobby for compensation. It is this norm of occasional, discretionary compensation that a legal system would strive to
avoid in order to minimize rent seeking.
Discretionary compensation for regulatory burdens doubles the
rent-seeking problem. Consider, for example, a proposal that old
buildings be required to incorporate access ramps. An owner might
face a $1 million cost. That owner might spend up to $1 million to forestall the regulation or to gain an exemption from it. In a world
where regulations are frequently held to amount to takings, constitutional obligations to compensate property owners dominate any incentives to lobby against the regulation. Of course, the compensation
requirement itself might decrease advocates’ likelihood of success in
gaining passage of the regulation such that we cannot say whether
compensation, even properly measured, is socially efficient. But with
discretionary compensation, things are more complicated. The optimistic story is that the expected cost of each ramp decreases because
there is some chance of full or partial compensation. If so, the affected property owner will not invest as heavily in preventing the regulation. From a rent-seeking perspective, this is good news. From a
power-politics perspective, however, it may be unfortunate inasmuch
as it is desirable to have someone argue against the regulation to prevent organized beneficiaries from too often getting their way at the

mentalism problem. Thus, if a proposed road imposes costs and benefits, interest
groups will line up to avoid one road and enjoy the other. A tax scheme that took
from the winners and compensated the losers might work wonders, but in most cases
incrementalism is not implicated. See Donald G. Hagman, Windfalls and Their Recapture
(discussing whether there is a feasible system to recapture gains in real estate value resulting from government action), in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE
AND COMPENSATION 15, 15-19 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978). A
proposed road’s precise location, once worked out, sends strong signals about the
road’s likely extension, so that there is more information rather than more dividing
and conquering.
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expense of dispersed taxpayers. It is, however, the rent-seeking perspective that is pursued in this Section.
There is also a pessimistic, and probably more plausible, story. It is
that the property owner must first worry about the $1 million loss the
ramp regulation would impose, and then, if the regulation passes or
looks likely to pass, the property owner has the chance to recoup the $1
million, provided that compensation can be obtained. If the steps are
thus decoupled, the rent-seeking potential doubles because there is first
a $1 million loss to worry about and then a $1 million gain to pursue. If
compensation is either mandated or forbidden, and there is no cheating through other legislation, there is $1 million, rather than $2 million, at stake, and there is less rent-seeking activity. This suggests yet
another reason why the compensation solution to the incrementalism
problem explored in Sections I.C and III.B above may do more harm
than good. If compensation accompanies a regulatory reversal, then it
will likely double the rent-seeking activity; the reversal is, in the lan61
guage of this discussion, discretionary. In short, from a rent-seeking
perspective, the incrementalism problem is made worse rather than
better by guaranteeing compensation for overregulation at the first
step, inasmuch as this overregulation is determined by the discretionary
step of voting down further regulation at a second step.
It is interesting that, as a matter of political practice, we do not
find compensation precisely where the problem of incrementalism is
most apparent. I resist starting with minimum-age legislation because
I have already argued that there is, strictly speaking, unlikely to be an
incrementalism problem in these settings. It is more interesting,
therefore, that we rarely find government-provided compensation
when an earlier safety standard is overruled. There is neither com-

61

The owner of a preexisting commercial building will fight the ramp requirement because there is no other interest group to ally with and because the regulatory
burden is serious. I have described the effort to get residential property owners to join
in the defense as fruitless. But if incrementalist regulation begins to burden shops, it is
possible that the earlier, regulated property owner can be induced to join in the defense—rather than root for the offense—in the interest of a level, competitive playing
field. The inducement might be in the form of a reversal such that there would be a
package combining the defeat of the proposal to expand retrofitting with a reversal of
the earlier regulation. If this were about incremental smoking bans, a reversal would
be valuable to the previously regulated restaurants. If it is about “irreversible” regulations, like costly ramps, reversal probably requires compensation. If the ramps in question could not have met a cost-benefit test, then the reversal does not eliminate the
social cost of the regulation, but from the private party’s point of view, reversal can be
accomplished through compensation. In these settings, it is surely the case that there
is double rent seeking at stake.
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pensation for the victims when the old standard is deemed too lax,
nor compensation for the precaution takers though the old regulation
is regarded as too extreme and costly. There are many possible explanations for this pattern, but a novel one is that we somehow recognize that such compensation would increase rent seeking. If we are to
compensate for the government’s past errors, it makes sense to make
the compensation nondiscretionary, as the Fifth Amendment may
have been intended to operate. Alternatively, we could place discretion in the hands of courts or agencies, if one dares to think that there
is less rent seeking in these domains.
IV. DISCLOSE OR DELIMIT
The incrementalism problem has one potential solution that seeks
to work within power politics without exacerbating rent seeking and
without running into the dangers of overcompensation and undercompensation. The strategy is to force disclosure of information
about regulatory goals. At the outset of a campaign, advocates might
be required to state their goal, or the import of their cost-benefit
analysis, and then be barred from proceeding beyond this point for a
specified period of time—perhaps five years. For example, if a proposal banned smoking in restaurants, advocates would be asked to
declare where else they planned to propose bans. If they said that
they were working on a proposal for bars but thought that hotels
should do as they like on a floor-by-floor, free-market basis, then hotels in the jurisdiction would be guaranteed freedom from such regulation for five years from the date of enactment of the first ban. The
idea is to avoid the incrementalism problem by fully informing the
parties and encouraging them to form coalitions at the outset.
There are obvious problems with this disclose-or-delimit rule. The
advocates may not be an easily identified group, and they may not be
the same group that favors the next incremental step. Indeed, two
groups of advocates may have such different aims that one pushes for
the first step in order to force a delimitation that interferes with the
second group’s aims. An optimistic response to this problem—and
especially to the strategic behavior problem it raises—is that the disclosure process will simply force other groups to enter the fray at the
first step, resulting in the best antidote to the problem of incrementalism. Still, the identification problem is not a small one, and it reconnects with the problem of defining incrementalism itself. The disclose-or-delimit rule has other weaknesses: it forgoes useful learning
from regulation, and it forces the law to stand still even in the face of
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technological or other changes that might come about during the
prescribed moratorium. Compensation could offset some of these
drawbacks, but it is difficult to introduce compensation without making it discretionary and thus inviting rent seeking.
By way of example, imagine that home mortgages are soon regulated so that loans of more than 90% of the value of a property require debtor counseling or extra disclosure on the part of the originating bank. With a disclose-or-delimit approach, advocates of this
regulation (including a regulator like the Federal Reserve) must reveal whether they intend to push the rule to cover 80% mortgages,
second mortgages, and home-equity loans. Covering 80% mortgages
presents less of a divide-and-conquer issue because the same banks are
regulated in both steps, but a push to cover home-equity loans surely
presents an incrementalism problem. Lenders who expect to specialize in home-equity loans would be inclined to join in the defense
against the first step’s 90% regulation if the regulator or other advocate disclosed that inclusion of home-equity loans should be expected
in a later step. Note that the immediately affected banks might prefer
that the regulation extend to home-equity lenders, especially once
they are themselves regulated, but they are more inclined to be allied
in the political process against all regulation if the coalition can repel
the first step. But what about later regulatory proposals regarding interest rates, font size for disclosure materials, and the like? A discloseor-delimit rule that included all regulations affecting the subject matter seems absurd because it would force omnibus bills or calculations
of a size previously unknown. Yet, a proposal regarding disclosure
forms, maximum interest rates, or appraisal requirements might well
be closer in political kind to the 90% rule than the others mentioned
above. It is simply difficult to define subjects in a way that allows us to
say what is incremental and what is sufficiently unrelated. The problem is akin to, but surely more serious than, that which accompanies a
62
single-subject rule for legislation.
But a second example suggests the promise of the disclose-ordelimit idea. Imagine that the threat of serious climate change generates a proposal for a carbon tax. Political opposition comes from various industries. We might imagine that the first proposal sets a modest carbon tax that exempts, directly or on a pass-through basis, the
62

See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 803, 811-31 (2006) (describing the history of, justifications for, and inconsistent
application of the single-subject rule found in many state constitutions and applicable
to legislation).
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carbon consumption of specified industries, such as steel and automobile manufacturing. The incrementalism “problem,” or perhaps
blessing, is that aluminum manufacturers and other interests might
soon turn on the exempt industries. A disclose-or-delimit rule provides a period during which policymakers cannot extend the tax to
these other industries. Similarly, if, instead of a carbon tax, legislation
requires aluminum and other manufacturers to switch away from a
high-carbon energy source, the switching requirement could not be
extended in incremental fashion during the period of delimitation.
In both cases, the rule encourages an upfront coalition and a political
discussion. The alternative of compensating the aluminum makers
for their investments if the switching requirement is reversed may also
be workable.
To be sure, interest groups may simply not believe that the discloseor-delimit (or compensation) rule will be enforced. A future legislature
can override a previously enacted rule, and of course there will be rentseeking losses in the process of convincing this second legislature to do
so or not to do so. This is the familiar and difficult problem of governmental precommitment, and its solutions draw on ideas about constitutional constraints and political reputation. Political reputation might
do the job, but only if the public perceives that incrementalism has
been well defined. This might be so if advocates, or the legislation itself, can specify all the steps that could not be taken for five years. A
ban on assault weapons might say: “No further ban, tax, or registration
requirement shall be imposed for five years following the effective date
of this statute on the firearms defined herein, and no ban, tax, registration requirement, or liability rule shall be imposed on any firearm not
defined herein.” A proposal to require a safety class or to require hunters to wear blaze orange might then pass because voters perceive that
the ambiguity in the delimitation provision should be resolved in favor
of safety legislation. In contrast, a proposal to issue hunting licenses only to persons over the age of twenty-one might be understood as a further, incremental ban, and, given the law passed earlier, political pressure might make its presentation or passage very difficult. In the
carbon example, a legislature that violated the moratorium by extending the carbon tax to the automobile industry would probably face political repercussions, but one that did so as part of a package including
bailout funds would not. A government that required a particular environmentally friendly technology would probably face serious opposition
if it sought to renege on a commitment to compensate. Gun control
and a carbon tax are more difficult subjects of compensation, whether
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promised upfront or in the event of a regulatory reversal. In sum, it is
difficult to generalize about the credibility of promises to delimit or to
compensate. There are settings, however, in which each promise seems
reasonably credible.
CONCLUSION
Incremental regulation can divide interest groups and pit them
against one another. The process can be good or bad for the polity.
Better laws might emerge from a process that is more transparent, less
path dependent, and more likely to bring affected interests to the table all at once. If interested parties with full information would have
defeated a proposal, then it is troubling—though sometimes fortunate—that a step-by-step approach engineered, or stumbled upon, by
advocates of the same proposal might succeed in implementing it.
The problem is more than a mere voting paradox because the defeat
of the all-or-nothing proposal is a stable result. This incrementalism
problem negates some of the enthusiasm otherwise attached to moderation in legislation, agency regulation, and even judicial decisionmaking. At the same time, it is difficult to know when incrementalism is a
problem. Irreversibility surely plays some role, and the prospect of learning from regulation offers something of a counterweight, though less than
usually imagined. The problem is most likely to be present when the burdened groups are competitors who might turn on one another and when
the advocates are well organized or simply bear few costs.
Even where we are certain that there is troubling incrementalism,
it is a difficult problem to solve. Compensation can undo past regulation and bring interest groups together where they were once divided
and conquered, but it introduces new misalignments in the world of
power politics, and, when discretionary, it increases wasteful rent seeking as well. Compensation may double the problem rather than solve
it. Disclosure is another problem-solving tool, but it can do more
harm than good where disparate groups favor incremental regulation.
One modest conclusion is that the incrementalism problem offers
a means of understanding why some slippery slopes seem more troubling than others. Another is that incrementalism has acquired far too
good a name. More drastic changes, especially if they do not impose
large, upfront, irreversible costs, might well be superior to incremental ones. I have emphasized relatively mundane examples, such as
smoking bans and disability accommodations, because the mechanics
of incrementalism are most readily observed in familiar, reasonably
settled areas. But we have yet to confront incrementalism as it per-
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tains to less settled matters, such as climate-change policy and healthcare reform. These are fields in which some awareness of the problem of incrementalism is more likely to illuminate legal and policy
choices than is the rhetoric of the slippery slope.
It is difficult to solve a problem that is barely in the eye of the beholder. One person’s incremental change is another’s dramatic
upheaval. Every law can be described as a step toward another. Yet,
there is reason to think that we can identify situations in which a proposed change falls short of its advocates’ wishes and situations in
which an interest opposed to and burdened by this first change would
have reason, once it loses, to join the other side and encourage further change. In these situations, some skepticism about moderation is
in order, and a disclose-or-delimit rule, or even a mandatory retroactive-compensation rule, may hold promise.

